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INMODUCTION
"[B]eyond the pale" is how the drafters of Article Nine of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("Code" or "U.C.C.")' regarded tort claims
They considered tort claims to be noncommercial assets inappropriate for
inclusion as collateral within the scope of a commercial financing
statute? Tort claims may not be out-of-bounds much longer. The Article
Nine Study Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code ("Study Committee") recommends expansion of the
Article's scope to encompass security interests in claims arising out of
tort This recommendation is significant. Tort causes of action comprise
1 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the "Uniform Commercial Code," the
"Code," or the "U.C.C." are to the 1990 Official Text, and all refernces to "Article
Nine" are to Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code.
2 1 GRANT GILMoRE, SECUR= INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PRoPERTY 316 (1965). The
exclusion provides, "This Article does not apply ... to a transfer in whole or in part of
any claim arising out of tort." U.C.C. § 9-104(k). In 1956, the Editorial Board for the
Code recommended the exclusion to achieve greater clarity and precision in defining the
transactions "entirely" excluded from Article Nine. AMERICAN LAW INsTE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISsIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1956
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDrrORiAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
257-58 (1956). This recommendation was pursuant to a suggestion by the New York Law
Revision Commission. STATE OF NEw YORY, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMIS-
SIoN 466 (1956). The exclusion also may have been intended to permit each individual
state to apply its own public policies with respect to transactions involving tort claims.
See generally William D. Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article Nine of the
U.C.C. -Part IV- The Scope ofArticle Nine, 77 COM. L.J. 79, 83 (1972). According to
Professor Grant Gilmore, a principal drafter of Article Nine, the extent to which tort
claims were actually used as collateral was never investigated. The drafters were told or
assumed they were not so used. Professor Gilmore came to the conclusion that tort claims
should have been included within the Article's scope. See Letters from Professor Grant
Gilmore to Professor Harold R. Weinberg (Feb. 12, 1976 & May 21, 1976) (on file with
author) (discussing Harold R. Weinberg, Tort Claims as Intangible Propery: An
Exploration firom an Assignee's Perspective, 64 KY. L.J. 49 (1975-1976)).
'1 GILMORE, supra note 2, at 316. Code commentary states that tort claims are
excluded because they "do not customarily serve as commercial collateral ... .' U.C.C.
§ 9-104 cmt. 8.
4 See PEB Study Group Uniform Commercial Code Article 9, Report, Permanent
Editorial Board of the Uniforn Commercial Code 58-59 (1992) [hereinafter PEB Study
Group]. The recommendations are as follows:
SECURITY INTERESTS IN TORT CLAIMS
an ever-expanding universe of civil wrongs for which courts afford redress.5
The owners of tort claims range from financially strong business enterprises
seeking redress for patent infiingement to impecunious pedestrians injured by
automobiles.6
The Study Committee's recommendations raise many important questions.
Historically, transactions in tort claims, especially "personal" tort claims such
as claims for personal injury, have been associated with a "witch's brew"7 of
social evils. Therefore, two issues are whether these concerns are legitimate
and, if so, whether these evils would increase if tort claims could be
encumbered under Article Nine Another set of questions centers on the
practices of'"reimbursees" such as insurers and medical care providers. They
will want to know how the Study Committees recommendations will impact
their rights to be reimbursed from the tort claims of their insureds and
patients.
Part One of this Article provides terminology and concepts useful for
understanding Article Nine tort claims exclusion. It also briefly describes
issues of interpretation raised by the exclusiont statutory language.9 Part
Two explores reasons for and against including tort claims as collateral within
Article Nine's scope. It concludes that, on balance, expanding the Article
A. Section 9-104(k) should be revised to expand the scope of Article Nine to
include security interests in claims (other than claims for personal injury)
arising out of tort, to the extent that such claims are assignable under
applicable non-U.C.C. law.
B. The Drafting Committee should consider seriously whether to expand the
scope of Article Nine to include security interests in claims for personal
injury arising out of tort.
C. Article Nine or the official comments should be revised to make clear that
Article Nine applies to security interests in rights to payment that derive
from claims arising out of tort (e.g., rights to payment under a settlement
agreement or a promissory note given to evidence liability in tort).
Id.
See W. PAGE KEEION Er AL., PROSSER AND KEEION ON THE LAW OF ToRTs §
1 (5th ed. 1984); Kenneth S. Abraham, What is a Tort Claim? An Interpretation of
Contemporary Tort Reform, 51 MD. L. REV. 172, 203 (1992).
6 See generally GEORGE ALucANDER, COMMERCIAL TORTS (2d ed. 1988); 2
FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTs 261-375 (2d ed. 1986) (concerning
business torts); 3 id § 17.5 (relating to statutory standards of conduct).
7 This metaphor is derived from the writings of Professor Charles W. Wolfran he
wrote that maintenance, champerty, and barratry were "the Macabethian witches of the
common law who stin-ed the cauldron of despised litigation." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LE AL ETHIcs 489 (student ed. 1986).
' The Study Committee indicated that "caution" should be exercised in deciding
whether tort claims for personal injury should be brought within Article Nine. See PEB
Study Group, supra note 4, at 59.
' See infra notes 13-31 and accompanying text.
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scope to encompass tort claims is a good idea. However, the various
concerns associated with transactions in personal tort claims require that
consideration be given to amending other parts of the Article's official
text and comments."0 Part Three of this Article evaluates some amend-
ments directed at these concerns. I' The Article concludes that Article
Nine should encompass personal as well as nonpersonal tort claims and
that additional tort claim-related amendments are not needed. However,
it is necessary to revaluate the Article's exclusion of judgments as
collateral. The conclusion also briefly discusses remedies that would be
available to creditors secured by tort claims and defenses that may be
asserted against them.'2
L TORT CLAIMS AND ARTICLE NNE
A "claim" is an assertion of a legal right to something. 3 The
ultimate value of a tort claim employed as collateral resides in the fund
which may be obtained to satisfy the secured obligation through
liquidation of the claim.'4 The liquidation process can result in "deriva-
tive rights" which are property rights that would not exist but for the. tort
claim.'5
For example, negotiations between the claimant and a tortfeasor may
place a value on a tort cause of action and provide the claimant with
derivative contractual rights under a settlement agreement with the
tortfeasor. As each payment under the agreement becomes due, the
tortfeasor delivers a check drawn upon its bank account to the claim-
ant."6 The claimant thereby becomes a holder of the check with a
10 See infra notes 32-165 and accompanying text.
n See infra notes 166-96 and accompanying text.
'2See infra notes 197-212 and accompanying text.
" E OLUNKoFF'S DICTIONARY oF AMERIc LEGAL USAGE 81 (1992) [hereinafter
MELLINKOFF'S DICTIONARY].
'I A secured party may have its own tort cause of action for impainnent of a security
interest even if it does not have a security interest in the debtor's tort cause of action.
See, e.g., Baldwin v. Marina City Properties, Inc., 145 Cal. Rptr. 406, 410 (Ct. App.
1978). A security agreement which fails to create a security interest in a tort claim
because of the tort claim exclusion from Article Nine's scope may be sufficient to create
an extra-Code lien. See Bluxome St. Assocs. v. Woods, 254 Cal. Rptr. 198, 202 (Ct. App.
1978).
1, In Article Nine terminology, derivative rights might be thought of as "proceeds"
of the original tort claim. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1). However, the definition of proceeds
requires amendment to make this result legally certain. See PEB Study Group, supra note
4, at 106, 110-11.
6 -Structured" settlements apportion a loss by stretching out payment over a period
of years instead of providing immediate lump-sum compensation to the injured party. See
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derivative contractual right to payment of the instrument. 7 If the
tortfeasor's bank subsequently pays the instrument, then the claimant
acquires the derivative right to withdraw the funds from the claimant's
bank account."s Other derivative rights include the claimant's rights
under a judgment against the tortfeasor, 9 the claimant's rights under its
own insurance policy or the tortfeasor's policy," and the claimant's
rights under an annuity purchased in settlement of a tort claim.
Article Nine's original drafters gave little or no consideration to the
use of tort claims as collateral 2 Therefore, it is not surprising that the
Article's official text does not sharply delineate its scope with regard to
derivative rights. Ambiguity results because the word "claim" used in the
Article's exclusion of any "claim arising out of tort" is undefined.' It
also lacks a precise usage. The phrase "arising out of" contributes to
2 WARREN FRMMAN, RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 12:7[d] (6th ed. 1990).
17 See U.C.C. §§ 3-105(a), 3-414.
Id. § 4-215.
Article Nine does not apply to a right represented by a judgment unless the
judgment was taken on a right to payment which was itself collateral. See id. § 9-104(h).
For further discussion of this exclusion, see infra text accompanying notes 25-29, 197-
202.
' Article Nine excludes transfers of interests in or claims under insurance policies
unless the insurance is payable to a party to the security agreement by reason of loss or
damage to collateral See U.C.C. §§ 9-104(g), 9-306(1). The Study Committee specifically
recommends that if Article Nine is amended to encompass security interests in tort claims,
then it should also be revised to govern security interests in rights under a third party's
insurance polices. See PEB Study Group, sqpra note 4, at 57 n.5. As a matter of
insurance law, a tort victim may have rights against the tortfeasor's liabilitfy insurer. See
generally 8 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §
4831 (1981). More generally, the Study Committee also recommends that consideration
be given to expanding the Article's scope to include security interests in most forms of
business insurance and at least some forms of personal insurance such as health insurance.
See PEB Study Group, supra note 4, at 56-57.
21 See Legal Economic Evaluations, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 951
(1994) (describing use of annuities intort settlements). Some nonuniform variations from
the Code's official text exclude security interests in contracts for an annuity. See U.C.C.,
3 U.LA. 182-85 (master ed. 1992) [hereinafter UIJORM LAws ANNOTATED].
2 See supra note 2.
- See U.C.C. § 9-105 (containing definitions and index of definitions). The tort
claims exclusion is quoted supra note 2. A tort claim is personal property that would fall
within the scope of Article Nine absent the exclusion. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (stating that
Article Nine applies to security interests in"personal property"); see generally Weinberg,
supra note 2.
24 According to Black's Law Dictionaq, "claim" is a "broad, comprehensive word."
BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 313 (4th ed. 1951). Amore modem definition provides that
it is "an assertion of a legal right to somethin often in the form of a demand ... or
pleadings ... ,in an almost infinite variety of legal contexts." MELLINKOFF'S DICITO-
1994-951 447
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the ambiguity because it does not strictly limit the exclusion to tort
causes of action.' The exclusion might be read broadly to exclude both
tort causes of action and all derivative rights.2" Drafting history may
support this interpretation.' Alternatively, the exclusion might be read
more narrowly to exclude tort causes of action but not derivative
rights2 Under either reading, the law of assignments would apply to the
extent that Article Nine does not?5 Support for both readings may be
found in the case law and legal commentary concerning the exclusion.'
NARY, supra note 13, at 81. In insurance usage, "claim" signifies a petition or demand
made to the party responsible for a loss or to its insurer. RONALD C. HORN, SUBROGA-
TION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACICE 4 n.4 (1964).
2' U.C.C. § 9-104(k). Another source of ambiguity is the exclusion's reference to a
transfer of any tort claim 'In whole or in part." Id. Perhaps it reflects the possibility that
a cause of action might be split, such as where the same tort causes both personal injury
and property damage. A minority of jurisdictions permit the splitting of causes of action.
See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WiDiss, INSURANCE LAW: A GUmE TO FUNDAMEN-
TAL PRINCIPLES,' LEGAL DOCTRNEs, AND COMamCIAL PRAcicEs § 3.10(c)(2) (student
ed. 1988).
26 U.C.C. § 9-104(k).
2 See supra note 2.
U.C.C. § 9-104(k). Ambiguity is heightened because Article Nine expressly
excludes from its scope several intangible rights which might be derived from a tort
claim. Article Nine does not apply to certain rights represented by ajudgment and certain
transfers of interests in insurance policies. See supra notes 19, 20. In addition, U.C.C. §
9-104(1) provides that Article Nine does not apply "to a transfer of an interest in any
deposit account ... except as provided with respect to proceeds ... and priorities in
proceeds ... ." A "deposit accounf includes a time or demand account maintained
with a bank. See id. § 9-105(l)(e). The Study Committee recommends that Article Nine
be revised to include deposit accounts within its scope as original collateral. PEB Study
Group, supra note 4, at 68.
' See In re Ore Cargo, Inc., 544 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Olin Assocs., 98
B.R. 271, 274 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 316 cmt. a (1981) (providing that rules applicable to assignments of
contractual rights may have some application to noncontractual choses in action); Id. §
342 cmt. a (stating that assignment rules ame applicable to assignments as security for an
obligation); 1 GILMORE, supra note 2, at 316 (stating that drafters intended that the pre-
Code common law of assignments would apply to security assignments of tort claims).
There also is extra-Code law relating to the assignment of insurance policies. See U.C.C.
§ 9-104 cmt. 7.
30 Some cases exclude both tort causes of action and derivative rights. See, e.g., In
re Ore Cargo, 544 F.2d at 81 (concluding that a security agreement could not encumber
proceeds from settlement of a tort claim). Other, predominantly more recent cases include
some derived rights within the Article's scope. For example, according to some case law,
the exclusion does not apply to proceeds of a settlement agreement entered into by the
debtor with the defendant on what may have been a tort claim. See In re Phoenix Marine
Corp., 20 B.R. 424, 426 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982). Some case law also states that the
proceeds of the settlement of an insurance claim for damages to the debtor's property may
[Vol 83
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This Article employs the term "claim" in its broader sense to encompass
both tort causes of action and derivative rights?'
I. To EXCLUDE, OR NOT TO EXCLUDE?
If Article Nine's tort claims exclusion is repealed but all else in the
Article is unchanged, then the Article would apply to all transactions
intended to create security interests in tort causes of action and derivative
rights.' Tort claims could serve as original collateral and as proceeds
of other collateral." The only exceptions would consist of derivative
rights that are excluded by some other limit upon the Article's scope.'
A security interest in tort claims would be governed by Article
Nine's rules with regard to matters such as perfection, priority, and
default.' Like security interests in other types of collateral, a perfected
be encumbered as original collateral under a security agreement. See In re Bell Fuel
Corp., 99 B.R. 602, 606 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.), aff d sub nom. Meridian Bank v. Bell Fuel
Corp., 891 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1989). These more recent cases were influenced by U.C.C.
§ 9-306(l)'s specification that insurance payable by reason of loss or damage to the
collateral is proceeds. This language was added by the 1972 amendments to Article Nine.
See PERMANENT EDrrORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMECIAL CODE, FINAL
REPORT 95 (1971).
31 The author once argued that it is sensible to read Article Nine to exclude
derivative rights as well as tort causes of action. Weinberg, supra note 2, at 87. The Study
Committee believes that Article Nine does not exclude a right to payment that derives
from a tort claim. See PEB Study Group, supra note 4, at 59.
32 The covered transactions would include security interests created by agreements
which fcially appear to be absolute assignments, but which are actually intended to
create security interests. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a), (2). Assignments which are absolute
in form and which do not secure payment or performance of an obligation would not be
within Article Nine'sscope. See id. § 1-201(37). Thus, absolute assignments of tort claims
do not receive treatment comparable to sales of accounts or chattel paper which are within
Article Nine's scope. Id. § 9-102(1)(b). Presumably, the Study Committee'srecommenda-
tions would not change this result PEB Study Group, supra note 4, at 43-48 (recommend-
ing that sales of general intangibles for the payment of money be included within Article
Nine's scope). With the recommended changes, Article Nine would remain substantially
irrelevant to statutory liens that might attach to tort claims. See U.C.C. §§ 9-102(2), 9-
310. For example, some jurisdictions have statutes providing for attorneys' liens on causes
of action. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 13, pam. 14 (Smith-Hurd 1963 & Supp. 1991).
The Study Committee recommends that serious consideration be given to extending some
provisions of Article Nine to extra-Code liens. PEB Study Group, sumra note 4, at 181.
3' For example, a creditor might take a security interest in an existing tort claim as
"original collateral." See U.C.C. § 9-203(1). A tort claim might be encumbered as
''proceeds" where original collateral, a motor vehicle, for example, is tortiously injured
and the security agreement contains no after-acquired property clause. See supra note 15
(concerning proceeds).
' See supra notes 19-21, 28 and accompanying text.
3" See U.C.C. Article Nine pts. 3-5.
1994-951
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security interest in a tort claim could be enforced in the debtor's
bankruptcy proceeding' by the secured party with priority over unse-
cured creditors."
Is bringing tort claims within Article Nine's scope desirable? To
answer this question, it is necessary to consider reasons pro and con.
A. Reasons for Repealing the Exclusion
Repeal of the tort claims exclusion obviously would eliminate the
statutory ambiguity described in Part One.' Many additional reasons for
taking this step exist.
1. Many Tort Claims Are Assignable Property Rights
Including tort claims within Article Nine's scope would be entirely
consistent with the substantial body of state law permitting the consensual
assignment of many types of tort causes of action." Assignable claims
typically include torts which arise from wrongs to property, real or
personal, or which grow out of breach of contract.' Under this body of
law, assignable tort claims can be assigned for security purposes.4
' Tort causes of action belonging to the debtor at the time the banknptcy case is
commenced become part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (Supp.
1992) (stating that property of the bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case"). The Bankruptcy
Code extends the definition of property of the estate to include causes of action that ane
nonassiguable as a matter of state law, such as actions for personal injuries. See, e.g., In
re Cottrell, 876 F.2d 540, 542 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding bankruptcy court's declaration
that plaintiff's personal injury action against a third party was an asset of the bankruptcy
estate); Sierra Switchboard Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 789 F.2d 705, 709 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that regardless of whether a personal injury claim is transferable or
assignable under state law, such claims become part of the bankruptcy estate). See
generally 4 WILIAM M. CoLLiER, COLLIR ON BANKRUPTCY 541.10 (15th ed. 1979).
Because tort claims are property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, unsecured creditors can
reach them in the bankruptcy proceeding. However, the debtor may elect limited
protection under either state exemption law or exemptions set forth in the Bankruptcy
Code itself. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), (d) (Supp. 1992).
3 7 Perfected secured creditors can obtain priority over bankruptcy trustees
representing unsecured creditors. See generally BARYLEY CLARY, THE LAW OF SECURED
TRANSACuONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 6.01 (rev. ed. 1993).
"See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
E.g., City of Richmond v. Haynes, 122 S.E.2d 895, 898 (Va. 1961) (recognizing
that many types of tort actions may he consensually assigned).
4 Id.
"' See, e.g., Harvey v. Cleman, 400 P.2d 87,89 (Wash. 1965) (implying that the law
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Given the complete assignability of these claims, amending Article Nine
to permit security interests in them does not seem to be a drastic step. A
security interest in a debtor's tort claim, unlike an assignment which is a
transfer of ownership, would merely provide a creditor with a limited
right to resort to the claim upon the debtor's default under a security
agreement.42 Procedures outlined in the security agreement and Article
Nine would regulate the manner in which a secured creditor could reach
its debtor's tort claims.43
2. Utility to Secured Creditors
Tort causes of action and derivative rights are not "beyond the pale"
insofar as commercial fiancers are concerned. Situations exist in which
a security interest in tort claims would be very desirable from a secured
creditor's perspective. For example, tangible personal property collateral
such as a motor vehicle employed to secure an obligation might be
damaged by a tortfeasor. In such a case, the resulting tort cause of action
and derivative rights represent a substitute form of collateral. They
provide a means to recover the value that the original collateral had prior
to the tort or to restore the collateral to its original condition."
A tort cause of action and noninsurance derivative rights may be
especially important substitute collateral if insurance protecting the
collateral is not readily obtainable in the market.45 For example, a
secured party may take a security interest in a valuable trade secret
of assignments governs the assignment of a tort claim for security, provided the claim is
assignable).
42 See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-202, 9-203(l)(a).
4 See id. §§ 9-501 to 9-507.
" That tort claims may be a form of substitute collateral seems to be recognized in
Article Two of the U.C.C., which provides secured sellers (but not secured lenders) with
a cause of action against third persons who damage collateral. U.C.C. § 2-722. See
generally ROBERT HiL mAN Er AL., COMMON LAw AND EQ=urY UNDER TE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 22.05(l)(a) (1985) (arguing for broad definition of proceeds as any
economic substitute for collateral); PEB Study Group, supra note 4, at 110-11 (explaining
how a tort claim can replace the value collateral would have had to the secured party
absent the tort and how the tort claim is closely associated with the collateral). Of course,
the tort cause of action or the derivative rights may not be a perfect replacement since
damages and other relief may not fully compensate the creditor.45 When market insurance is available, secured parties typically look to insurance
proceeds as substitute collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1). See generally 14 BRADFORD
STONE, WEsTs LEGAL FORMS: COMMRiAL TRANSACnONS - DOCUMENTS OF Tr1E § 57.2
(2d ed. 1985).
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because of its commercial value." If a third party misappropriates the
trade secret, then the debtor may have to resort to its rights to recover
damages such as a reasonable royalty for the misappropriator's use or
disclosure of the trade secret.47 These remedies provide the debtor/trade
secret owner with a means to recover the value that the trade secret
would have provided the debtor absent the infringement. In general,
infringement torts may be important substitute collateral in the case of
security interests in many forms of intellectual property including patents,
copyrights, and trademarks."
A secured financer may find it necessary to look to a tort claim as
substitute collateral even when insurance can be purchased. This situation
might occur, for example, when, unbeknownst to the secured party, an
insurance policy lapses because of the debtor's failure to pay a premium.
Or it might occur when an effective policy has a substantial gap in
coverage because of appreciation of the insured asset, a deductible, or
inadequate policy limits.
Tort causes of action and derivative rights also may have value as
original collateral. For example, medical care providers that render
services on credit may seek security in patients' personal tort claims.'
In general, tort claims may represent valuable original collateral from the
perspective of creditors after appropriate discounting for the time value
of money and for uncertainty and other costs.5'
46 See generally DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING
InTEL AL PROPERLTY LAW § 3C[1][d] (1992).
4 See id. § 3F[2][a].
SInfrfingement causes of action are torts. See Carbice Corp. v. American Patents
Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (stating that patent infringement, "whether direct or
contributory, is essentially a tort"); RESTATEMENT OF TOTS § 757 (1938) (stating that
liability for improper disclosure or use of trade secrets sounds in tort); 2 . THOMAS
MCCARTHY, TRADEMAR AND UNFAIR COMPETTON § 25:3 (1973) ("[T]rademark
infringement and unfair competition are torts").
41 For example, a creditor who employs a debtor's patents or trademarks as collateral
typically also takes assignment of the debtor's rights to the proceeds of infringement
litigation. See THOMAS S. HEMMENDINGE., HaimAN ON COMMECIAL LOAN DOCUMEN-
TATION 318 (4th ed. 1994); Robert S. Bramson, Intellectual Properly as Collateral -
Patents, Trade Secrets, Trademarks and Copyrights, 36 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1599 (1981).
"See North Carolina Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Mitchell, 374 S.E.2d 844, 846 (N.C.
1988).
1t Costs relevant to the discount would include the risk that enforcement efforts
ultimately may fail, the probable future costs of the litigation process, and the risk that
the tortfeasor may become insolvent or be uninsured. See Grant Gilmore, The Assignee
of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security, 74 YALE L.J. 217, 224 (1964)
(suggesting that lenders can take steps to reduce their risks and protect their security
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3. Consistency with Artick Nine's Mandate
Nothing inherent in the nature of tort causes of action and derivative
rights demands their exclusion from Article Nine. The Article is not
merely a "commercial financing" statute. Its mandate is not so narrow.
Article Nine is intended to provide a "comprehensive scheme for the
regulation of security interests in personal property."52 This mandate
does not limit the Article to security interests in more common forms of
commercial collateral such as inventory, accounts receivable, and
equipment. 3 For example, the Article also applies to security interests
in beneficial interests under wills and trustsm It has been aptly de-
scribed as an "octopus" because of its very broad reach.55
4. The Virtues of Public Filing
Long-standing public policy concerns exist regarding transactions in
which a debtor assigns intangibles to a creditor/assignee but remains in
control of the assets or situations in which a secured transaction is kept
secret.' Filing statutes provide a common and inexpensive means to
publicize these transactions.' Thus, public policy argues in favor of
including tort causes of action and derivative rights within Article Nine's
scope because the Article provides a notice filing system.' The law of
assignments applies to secured transactions involving these assets to the
extent that Article Nine does not.5" Neither common law nor statutory
assignment law provides a means to publicize the existence of assign-
interests).
U.C.C. § 9-101 cint. 1.
" See id. § 9-102(1)(a) (stating that Article Nine applies to "personal property").
-1 Id. § 9-302(1)(c).
s CLARK, supra note 37, %j 1-13.
' See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 360 (1925) (holding that an assignment of
accounts receivable is invalid if debtor reserves dominion over the accounts receivable
inconsistent with the effective disposition of title). See generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr.,
The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article Nine Filing: A Crique of
Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV. 683, 725-36 (1988).
7 See generally 1 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 8.7 (discussing accounts receivable
statutes).
" See U.C.C. §§ 9401 to 9408. Arguments based upon these policies are not
necessarily overwhelming. Article Nine itself permits some "secret liens." See, e.g., id.
§ 9-302(l)(e) (pemitting automatic perfection of security interests in isolated assignments
of accounts).
" See supra text accompanying notes 29, 39, 41.
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ments of tort causes of action and derivative rights comparable to Article
Nine's filing system.6
5. Reducing Uncertainty and Complexity
The uncertainty and complexity that result from the interaction of
assignment law and Article Nine also are reasons for bringing security
interests in tort claims into Article Nine. For example, consider the plight
of the secured creditor in In re Ore Cargo, Inc." In order to secure a
loan, a bank entered into a general security agreement drafted and filed
in conformity with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. This
document created a security interest in the debtor's credits, claims,
demands and any other property, rights and interests and gave the bank
the rights in the security of a secured party under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.' The bank contended in the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding
that the security agreement encumbered the proceeds from the settlement
of a tort claim arising out of a nautical accident involving one of the
debtor's ships.
63
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the security
agreement could not encumber these funds.' The court reasoned that an
agreement creating the rights of an Article Nine secured creditor cannot
bestow a security interest in property which is not within the Article's
scope. Unfortunately for the bank, the agreement also was insufficient to
reach the tort claim proceeds under the law of assignments.65 The lesson
is that any creditor wishing to employ a tort claim or derivative rights as
collateral must understand that the law of assignments rather than Article
Nine may be applicable and must correctly apply assignment doctrine. If
the secured transaction involves both collateral within the scope of Article
Nine and excluded tort claims, then the creditor must work with both
bodies of law.
In re Monroe County Housing Corp.' presents another interesting
example of the complications created by the relevance of both assignment
- See .RESATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 341 cmt. d, 342 cmt. c (1981)
(discussing filing statutes applicable to assignments); cf. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1992)
(authorizing the recording of assignment of interests in patents).
544 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 81.
Id. The bank admitted that it did not know of the tort claim when the agreement
with the debtor was executed.
"In re Ore Cargo, 544 F.2d at 81.
'5Id.
29 B.R. 686 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983).
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doctrine and Article Nine to secured transactions involving tort causes of
action or derivative rights. Reduced to its bare operative facts, the case
involved a priority dispute between a judgment lien creditor and a
secured party. The judgment creditor obtained a writ of garnishment
which was served upon a tortfeasor who previously had entered into a
settlement agreement with the judgment debtor. One day after the
judgment creditor obtained its lien, the secured party filed a financing
statement to perfect a security interest in the judgment debtor's rights
under the settlement agreement. Apparently the security agreement was
entered into prior to the judgment lien, although the opinion is unclear
concerning timing.'
The court recognized that under Article Nine, the judgment creditor
was entitled to priority because it became a lien creditor before the
security interest was perfected.s Noting the tort claims exclusion, the
court further reasoned that the secured party was precluded from holding
a security interest in the settlement agreement. ' Unfortunately for the
secured party, neither it nor the court recognized that if Article Nine did
not apply to the security interest, then the Article's priority rules were
irrelevant to the dispute between the secured party and the lien credi-
tor.7" Had this been recognized, the secured party might have prevailed
under assignment doctrine.7
B. Reasons for Retaining the Exclusion
1. The Spectre of the Witch's Brew
"Personal" tort claims are claims for wrongs done to the person or
reputation or for personal wrongs aside from injury to property or
contract.7 Transactions in personal tort claims traditionally are problem-
67 Id. at 687.
Id. at 688; see U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
In re Monroe County Hous. Corp., 29 B.R. at 688.70Id.
"See generally Neilson Realty Corp. v. Motor Vehicle Indem. Corp., 262 N.Y.S.2d
652, 658 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (recognizing that a bona fide common law assignment of
proceeds of tort litigation gives priority to the assignee over judgment creditors whose
liens attach only to such interest as remains in the judgment debtor); RESTATEMEN
(SECoND) op Co€IAcrs § 341 (1981) (stating that the right of an assignee generally is
superior to a judicial lien subsequently obtained).
I See, e.g., Hedlund Mfg. Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d 357, 358 (Pa.
1988); City of Richmond v. Hanes, 122 S.E.2d 895, 898 (Va. 1961). See generally R.D.
Hursh, Annotation, Assignabilty of Claimfor Personal Injwy or Death, 40 A.L.R. 2D 500
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atic for policy reasons. They are not assignable in many jurisdictions.73
Other jurisdictions may generally permit the assignment of personal
claims but prohibit particular assignments on account of public policy.74
In both types ofjurisdictions the policy concerns are overlapping and
mutually reinforcing. They relate to a "witch's brew" of evils that are
collectively so referred to by this Article. The witch's brew includes the
possibility that unscrupulous interlopers and litigious persons would
purchase personal injury claims and prosecute them in court qua assignees
if such transactions were not restricted. 5 This evil is one of "traffick-
ing!' in lawsuits for pain and suffering.7' The witch's brew also includes
large portions of champerty' and maintenance ("C & M").7  Frequent-
(1955).
7 See, e.g., Hanes, 122 S.E.2d at 898. The set of nonassignable personal tort causes
of action is not the same in all jurisdictions. Some courts, reluctant to extend the
prohibition to other torts such as an insurer's refusal to settle, have limited the prohibition
against assignment to personal injury claims. E.g., Mello v. General Ins. Co., 525 A2d
1304, 1305-06 (R.I. 1987) (stating the general prohibition is "salutary," but it should not
be applied in a context in which it has no meaning). In other jurisdictions, courts have
extended the prohibition to actions founded upon wrongs of a purely personalnature, such
as injury to reputation or feelings, or to other causes of action. See Goodley v. Wank &
Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 86 (Ct. App. 1976). For example, legal malpractice claims
have been held nonassignable because of "the uniquely personal nature of legal services
and the contract out of which a highly personal and confidential attomey-client
relationship arises, and public policy considerations based thereon." Id. at 84-85.
However, the opinion that legal malpractice actions are nonassignable is not unanimous.
See generally Tom W. Bell, Comment, Limits on the Privty and Assignment of Legal
Malpractice Claims, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1992).
' D'Angelov. Cornell Paperboard Prod. Co., 120 N.W.2d 70,73 (Wis. 1963) (stating
that assignment of cause of action for personal injuries is generally permissible in
Wisconsin, although a particular assignment may violate public policy against speculation
in personal injury claims).
' Berlinski v. Ovellette, 325 A.2d 239, 242 (Conm. 1973).
' See, e.g., Croxton v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 758 P.2d 97, 99 (Alaska 1988);
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lea, 410 P.2d 495, 498 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966).
' Champerty involves a "bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such
third person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration
of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds ... sought to be recovered." BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY 292 (4th ed. 1951). Put another way, champerty is the "purchase of an
interest in a thing in dispute, with the object of maintaining and taking part in the
litigation." Id.
' Maintenance "consists in maintaining, supporting, or promoting the litigation of
another." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 292-93 (4th ed. 1951). It is the malicious
intermeddling with a suit that does not belong to one, by providing monetary or other
assistance to either party to the suit. Id. at 1106. Judicial opinions concerned with C &
M sometimes also mention barratry which, in criminal law, is the "offense of frequently
456 [Vol. 83
SECURITY INTERESTS IN TORT CLAIMS
ly raised in cases involving transactions in personal tort claims, " these
are the evils of excessive litigation or the commercialization of litiga-
tion Restrictions on assignability also may be justified by other
judicial reasoning."'
The witch's brew of evils reputedly stemming from unbridled
transactions in personal tort claims could be associated with transactions
in nonpersonal tort claims as well. For example, causes of action for
collision damage to automobiles conceivably could be the subject of
unsavory trafficking. Similarly, nonpersonal as well as personal claims
might be the subject of excessive or commercialized litigation.' Why
exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits." Id. at 190.
7' E.g., Caldwell v. Ogden Sea Transp., 618 F.2d 1037, 1048 (4th Cir. 1980); City
of Richmond v. Hanes, 122 S.E.2d 895, 898 (Va. 1961). See generally Susan Lorde
Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerly or New Business Opportmity?, 30 ANL
Bus. L.J. 485, 488-89 (1992) (containing a study of a C & M statute and case law).
to Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48, 66 (1935); see also
ME=INKoFF's DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 49 (stating that the essence of the offenses
is that they are made punishable in order to discourage litigation).
," Some jurisdictions hold that personal injury tort claims do not survive the death
of the tort victim and therefore are too "personal" in nature to be assigned. Berlinski v.
Ovellette, 325 A.2d 239, 241 (Conn. 1973). See generally Weinberg, supra note 2, at 50-
78 (discussing the equating of assignability with survivability). Concerns about the
assignment of tort claims may represent the last vestiges of an ancient hostility towards
the assignment of all choses in action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317
cmt c (1981) (stating that the historic rule of nonassignability of choses in action remains
applicable to some noncontractual choses such as for personal injury). See generally JOHN
CALAMARI & JOSEPH PMIULO, THE LAW OF CONTRACrs § 18-2 (3d ed. 1987) (stating
that the hostility towards assignments was based upon the personal nature of contracts and
the social policy against C & M). An additional reason for restricting transactions in tort
claims may exist. The conduct of potential tortfeasors might be influenced if tort claims
are freely alienable. The fewer the restrictions on alienability, the greater the chances that
an assignee of a tort claim might facilitate a lawsuit that, absent the assignment, would
not have been brought or would have been prosecuted with less vigor. A heightened
probability of liability imposes increased prevention costs on persons engaged in socially
useful but occasionally injurious conduct such as operating a bus line. (. RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 162-63 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing the relationship
between liability rules and activity levels of potential injurers).
' For example, New York has a statute which prohibits champertous transactions
involving any "thing in action." N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489 (McKinney 1983). Currently policy
debate exists concerning C & M in the context of the syndication of commercial tort
claims. See generally Cynthia L. Cooper, Champerty Anyone? Modern Investors Are
Trying to Sell Shares in Lawsuits, 10 CAL. LAW. 19 (1990) (describing several recent
cases of commercial tort claim syndication); Daniel C. Cox, Lawsuit S dcation." An
Investment Opportunity in Legal Grievances, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 153 (Fall 1990)
(discussing the implications of allowing civil litigants to finance the cost of litigation by
offering shares of stock in the outcome).
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then is condemnation so frequently focused upon transactions in personal
tort claims?
The fundamental ingredient in the witch's brew is the concern that a
personal tort claim provides a means for an injured human being to
receive damages necessitated by tortious injury to his or her body, mind,
or other personal dimensions.' Depending upon the jurisdiction and the
facts, the personal tort victim may legally deserve recovery for out-of-
pocket medical or rehabilitation expenses, pain and suffering, mental
anguish, permanent disability, lost wages, and so forth. Without his or
her claim, a personal tort victim might have to turn to other persons or
the state for assistance. The same fundamental concern for compensating
legally entitled personal tort victims explains related rules of law such as
restrictions imposed upon the rights of creditors to execute on personal
injury claims. 5 This Article refers to this fundamental concern for
human tort victims as "personal compensation policy."
Concerns based upon personal compensation policy and the other
evils of the witch's brew are not outcome determinative in all cases
involving transactions in personal tort claims. In some situations
assignments of these assets are legally acceptable because they facilitate
the compensation of personally injured victims or achieve other socially
valuable goals and the spectre of the witch's brew is reduced or not
present. 6 For example, assignments of personal tort claims to or from
8' See Croxton v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 758 P.2d 97, 99 (Alaska 1988) (indicating
that assignment of personal claim is permissible if the tort victim's beneficial interest is
protected).
" See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeJane, 326 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ohio Ct. App.
1974). See generally 2 AMmcAN LAW INSTTuTE, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBmrY FOR.
PERSONAL INJURY 161 (1991) [hereinafter ENTRRISE RE PONSIBILflY].
's See 9 THEODORE EISENBERG ET AL., DEBTOR-CREDrrOR LAw 37.03[A][6], at 37-
52, 37-53 (1991) (stating that compensation of victims is the "driving force" making
personal injury claims resistant to execution in many jurisdictions). Federal bankruptcy
law historically restricted the personal tort claims that could become part of a bankrupt
debtor's estate, thereby leaving the claim with the bankrupt debtor. See THOMAS D.
CRANDALL ET AL., THE LAW Op DEBTORs AND CsmrrORs 6-55 (1991). It was believed
that the "fresh start" goals of the Bankruptcy Act could not be achieved if the trustee was
permitted to take over the bankrupt's unliquidated personal tort claims. See In re
Schmelzer, 480 F.2d 1074, 1077 (1973) (holding that bankrupt's claim for personal injury
was not 'property" within a statute that vests a bankruptcy trustee with title to property
belonging to bankrupt person). However, this restriction no longer exists. The 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. 1992), makes personal
claims part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. See supra note 36.
" The issue of legality sometimes turns upon the manner in which the assignment
transaction is formally structured. For example, the assignment of a personal injury tort
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insurers are permitted because they facilitate compensation of the
insuredY Subrogation by which an insurer succeeds to the insured's
personal tort claim is judicially justified on compensation grounds." The
claim may be unlawful, whereas an assignment of the proceeds to be recovered in
personal injury tort litigation may be lawful. E.g., Behm's Estate v. Gee, 213 P.2d 657,
662 (Utah 1950) (stating that the rule sounds anomalous but is supported by precedent).
The policies against C & M are considered to pertain in the former case but not in the
latter. In re Musser, 24 B.R. 913, 921 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1982) (assignment of proceeds
of personal injury claim by patient to hospital providing medical care held valid). There
may be something to this dichotomy. In an assignment of proceeds, control of the action
or the formulation and consummation of any settlement agreement remains in the hands
of the assignor. Miller v. I.Aberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 264 N.Y.S.2d 319, 323 (App. Div.
1965), affd, 289 N.Y.S.2d 726 (App. Div. 1968). Some courts believe this is a distinction
without a difference. In Harvey v. Cleman, 400 P.2d 87, 90 (Wash. 1965), the
assignments of proceeds by a personal injury tort victim to an attorney and one other
person, as security for indebtedness, were held invalid.
" In one such case, the amount received by the minor children of a passenger killed
in an automobile collision with a train from the automobile driver's insurer was less than
the maximum obtainable in a wrongful death action. Cullen v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
507 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1973). A loan receipt agreement between the automobile insurer and
the guardian for the children stated that the funds received from the insurer were to be
repaid only out of any recovery obtained from the railroad pursuant to the children's
wrongful death action. The children's guardian futher agreed to prosecute the wrongful
death claim against the railroad. Id. at 360. The railroad argued that the loan receipt
agreement constituted an illegal assignment of a tort claim to the automobile insurer
because it violated public policies against C & M. The court disagreed. It reasoned that
the assignment was lawful because the insurer had a "possible interest" in any wrongful
death action brought on behalf of the children. Id. By this, the court probably meant that
it did not regard the insurer as an officious intenneddler in the suit. The court noted that
the "gist of maintenance" is an officious intermeddling in the suit of another. A person
"who has an interest in the subject of litigation may properly purchase an additional
interest free from a valid charge of maintenance." Id. (quoting 14 AM. JUL 2D.
Champefly and Maintenance § 9 (1964)). But see, e.g., Berlinski v. Ovellette, 325 A.2d
239, 242 (Conn. 1973) (stating that a trust agreement purporting to transfer insured's
personal injury cause of action to insurer is void under common law public policy). For
further discussion of loan receipts and trust agreements, see infra text accompanying notes
122-30.
" For example, a court considering subrogation rights under a medical insurance
policy reasoned that these rights serve beneficial social and economic purposes. Hospital
Serv. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105, 109-11 (R.I. 1967). In particular, they
reduce insurance rates by shifting to wrongdoers the costs occasioned by their negligence.
The court distinguished subrogation from assignments of causes of action for personal
injuries which are forbidden on the grounds of C & M. Id. Subrogation clauses in medical
insurance policies also may be distinguishable from other assignment agreements because
they prevent the unjust enrichment of an insured who otherwise could be doubly
compensated. Collins v. Blue Cross, 193 S.E.2d 782, 785 (Va. 1973). For additional
discussion of subrogation by insurers, see infra text accompanying notes 102-21.
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assignment of a personal tort claim in! and out' of insolvency pro-
ceedings has been upheld where the end result is to compensate a tort
victim, settle litigation, or accomplish some other laudable end. Assign-
ments of generally nonassignable personal tort causes of action are
pennissible to secure the cost of medical care.' Many jurisdictions have
I See Picadilly, Inc. v. Ralkos, 555 N.E.2d 167, 168 (nd. Ct. App. 1990). In this
case, a client filed a claim against its attorneys, alleging their failure to exercise proper
care in defending against a successful dram shop action brought by Colvin. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the attorneys. Subsequently, a bankruptcy court confirmed
the client'splan of reorganization under Chapter 11. The plan provided that Colvin's claim
would be discharged for consideration, including the transfer to Colvin of the client's
malpractice claim against the attorneys. Id. In the client's appeal of the adverse summary
judgment, the attorneys argued both that Colvin was the real party in interest and that the
appeal could not be maintained because legal malpractice claims are not assignable. The
appellate court acknowledged that the arguments against such assignments generally are
persuasive, but determined that they were not applicable to the case before it. Id. at 168-
69. The court reasoned that it was not confronted with the establishment of a general tort
claims market and that the assignee, Colvin, had an intimate connection with the assigned
cause of action. In the court's view, the assignment represented an efficient means to
realize the value of the claim because the assignee had the resources to bring the suit The
assignment was particularly appropriate because the action originally was brought in the
client's name, and the facts were developed through the client's discovery. Id. A
concurring opinion was concerned that the majority's holding would lead to a practice of
defeated defendants routinely assigning legal malpractice claims as a means of avoid-
ing or deferring the payment of judgments against them. Id. at 171-72 (Baker, I.,
concurring).
" See Desenne v. Jamestown Boat Yard, Inc., 968 F.2d 1388, 1391 (1st Cir. 1992)
(upholding assignment by plaintiff of personal tort claim against defendant A to
defendant B as not champertous when part of a settlement between plaintiff and defendant
B).
9' See Hemandez v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 572 A.2d 144 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
In this case, the court first determined that the assignment of an unliquidated personal
injury tort claim for money damages posed neither any danger of C & M nor any other
public policy concern. The patient assigned proceeds of the tort claim. The opinion
considered but did not adopt the theory that this arrangement is substantively different
from the assignment of a tort cause of action. Id. at 147-48. Rather, the high cost of
health care provided a good reason to enforce the assignment which afforded a measure
of protection to both the patient and the hospital. Id. at 148. The court reasoned that
patients injured by the actions of others often are not in a position to pay for medical care
at the time they receive it. Frequently these costs constitute special damages in the
patient's eventual action against the tortfeasor. However, under the jurisdiction's law,
flmds recovered in such an action are not subject to execution by judgment creditors,
including health care providers. As a result, if assignment of the tort cause of action were
not permitted, the provider might quickly pursue its claim against the patient-tort victim.
An enforceable assignment forestalls such action by providing assurance that proceeds
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workers' compensation statutes which assign employees' wrongful death
claims against third parties to employers.'
Security interests in tort claims, including personal claims, would not
necessarily fall victim to condemnation on account of the spectre of the
witch's brew. The law of C & M is instructive. Today these doctrines are
"vestigial."' 3 Strangers who, motivated by profit, buy their way into a
legal dispute are still the subjects of lingering suspicion.' However, a
doctrine of primary purpose may permit the acquisition of an interest in
a lawsuit for a business purpose so long as the purpose of suing is
incidental. 5
2. Fear of Dragnets
The Study Committee's proposal could further exacerbate concerns
about the witch's brew because it may result in a significant increase in
the number of transactions involving tort claims. Many security agree-
ments encumber general intangibles."6 These provisions could "drag in"
tort causes of action and derivative rights if these assets are brought
within a revised Article Nine's scope.' 7 This result may benefit secured
creditors but provide no commensurate benefit to debtors such as a lower
interest rate. Some, perhaps many, creditors and debtors entering into
these security agreements may not fully appreciate that they are encum-
bering existing and future tort claims.98 A security interest in general
from the tort claim will be used to defray the cost of medical care. Id.
' See, e.g., Croxton v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 758 P.2d 97, 99 (Alaska 1988)
(discussing ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.015(c) (1991)); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 13, para.
14 (Smith-Hurd 1963 & Supp. 1991) (providing attorneys with liens on causes of action
to secure their legal fees).
"WOLRAM, supra note 7, at 489.
See Id. at 490.
See id. at 489, 490 n.56.
See JAMES I WmrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 981
(3d ed. 1988) (noting that the Code categories for collateral contained in many security
agreements, such as "general intangibles," are "strong evidence of the parties' actual
intentions. .. " (emphasis in original)).
97 See U.C.C. §§ 9-102(1)(a), 9-106. Broadly drafted collateral descriptions are
sometimes referred to as "dragnet" clauses. See In re Eastern Marine Inc., 104 B.R. 421,
424 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989). The term is also employed to describe future advance
clauses. See CLARK, supra note 37, 10.01[3].
" See In re Ore Cargo, Inc., 544 F.2d 80, 81 (2d Cir. 1976) (refusing to imply a
security interest in tort claim on the basis of the general language of a security
agreement). An after-acquired property clause is probably necessary to encumber tort
claims which arise after the security agreement is signed by the debtor. See infia note 188
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intangibles which sweeps in tort claims also may be objectionable on the
grounds that it "picks the debtor clean." This Article refers to concerns
about the potential increase in the number of agreements encumbering
tort claims as "dragnet" concerns.
3. Interference with Reimbursees
Insurers that have paid policy proceeds or benefits may look for
"reimbursement" through their insureds' tort causes of action and
derivative rights." Other persons such as medical care providers also
may seek reimbursement from tort claims."° All such persons are
collectively referred to by this Article as "reimbursement claimants."
Reimbursement claimants may object to the Study Committee's proposed
inclusion of tort claims within Article Nine's scope if they believe it
would impact their existing business practices or take away legal
advantages they enjoy under existing law. 1' Evaluating this potential
and accompanying text.
9 As used in this Article, 'reimbursement' means repayment. The term is not used
in its narrow suretyship sense of a recovery obtained by a surety from a principal obligor.
See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SuRm miP § 18 (restating duty of principal obligor
to reimburse secondary obligor).
"' Medical care providers may obtain contractual assignments of patients' tort claims
in return for the provision of medical services. See, e.g., North Carolina Baptist Hosps.,
Inc. v. Mitchell, 374 S.E.2d 844, 847 (N.C. 1988). A statutory right to obtain reimburse-
ment may exist in favor of these persons, see Ehlers v. Perry, 494 N.W.2d 325, 331 (Neb.
1993), as may a state law statutory lien on patients' recoveries from tortfeasors, see, e.g.,
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I §§ 16-601 to 16-605 (1974). See generally Carol A.
Crocca, Annotation, Construction, Operation, and Effect of Statute Giving Hospital Lien
Against Recovery from Tortfeasor Causing Patient's Injuries, 16 A.L.R. 5TH 262 (1993).
Currently Article Nine lacks a provision dealing with the priority of nonpossessory liens.
See U.C.C. §§ 9-104(c), 9-310. The Study Committee has recommended that consider-
ation be given to the relationship between Article Nine and statutory and common law
liens. See PEB Study Group, supra note 4, at 181. Other persons also may look to tort
claims in order to obtain reimbursement for an expenditure. See generally V. Woemer,
Annotation, Right of One Who Pays Medical or Similar Expenses of Injured Person
Under Life Care, or Similar Contract to Recover the Cost Thereof From Torfeasor, 78
A.L.R. 2D 822 (1961); H.C. Lind, Annotation, Right of Recovery by Means of
Subrogation or Similar Theory, Against a Third-Person Tortfeasor, of an Employer Who
Has Paid Salay, Wages, Sick Leave Pay, Medical Expenses, or the Like, to or for an
Injured Employee, 70 A.L.R. 2D 475 (1960).
101 Insurers have been influential in shaping the scope of Article Nine. See 1
GiLMom, supra note 2, at 315 (stating that Article Nine's insurance exclusion in U.C.C.
§ 9-104(g) was "politically inspired"). Surety companies also were successful in
protecting their reimbursement rights during the original drafting of Article Nine. See
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objection requires an explanation of the nature of reimbursement rights
and their relationship to secured transactions governed by Article Nine.
This Article focuses on the reimbursement rights of insurers.
a. Subrogation
Insurers' reimbursement rights frequently are couched in terms of
"subrogation." A general definition of subrogation is "[w]hen by law or
agreement, a person is required to (and does) discharge a debtor's
obligation to a creditor, that person (the subrogee) acquires (is subrogated
to) the rights that the creditor (the subrogor) had against the debtor."'"
Similar definitions are employed in insurance and suretyship law."°3 A
subrogee may be viewed as being substituted for the subrogor, or as
"standing in the subrogor's shoes." Subrogation developed as an equitable
doctrine intended to avoid unjust enrichment.' From a remedial
standpoint, a subrogee may be entitled to an equitable assignment of a
subrogated cause of action,"5 a constructive trust or equitable lien on
the proceeds derived from the cause of action, or other forms of
relief.106
An insurer that indemnifies its insured as required by the insurance
contract may be permitted to assert the insured's cause of action against
the tortfeasor that allegedly caused the insured's loss. °7 The insur-
er/subrogee would be subject to any defenses that the tortfeasor has
against the insured/subrogor."' In reality, subrogation proceedings
frequently are between the insurers of the tort victim and of the tort-
feasor. 1
9
infra note 158.
10 MELLINKOFF'S DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 625.
'
0 See National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d 843, 844
(1st Cir. 1969) ("The equitable principle is that when one, pursuant to obligation - not
a volunteer, fulfills the duties of another, he is entitled to assert the rights of that other
against third persons."). See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SURET'YSHP § 23
cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1993); HORN, supra note 24, at 11-14.
10 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 25, at 219; see RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
SuRaTYsmP § 23 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1993).
105 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF SURErYSHIP § 23 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No.
2, 1993); HORN, supra note 24, at 15.
10" See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. First State Bank, 494 P.2d 1149, 1157
(Kam 1972); KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 25, at 244-46.
0 KEETON & WMISs, supra note 25, at 219.
106 ROBERT H. JERRY If, UNDERSTANDING INSuRANCE LAw 462 (1987).
109 HORN, supra note 24, at 14.
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An insurer's right of subrogition may be independent of any express
provision for subrogation in the insurance contract and thus based entirely
upon legal principles ("legal subrogation!)." It also may be provided by
express contractual language of assignment ("conventional subrogation!).I'
In some cases it is unclear whether an insurer is relying on legal or conven-
tional subrogation rights."2 Explicit conventional subrogation provisions
generally are enforced on account of the freedom of contract policy."'
Two justifications are most fiquently offered in support of the insurers
right to subrogation. First it avoids the unjust enrichment of the tortfeasor
who might otherwise escape damage liability if the insured is compensated
for its losses by the insurer.' 4 This result furthers the economic goal of loss
prevention."5 Second, subrogation avoids overcompensation of the insured
that otherwise might successfully pursue damages from the tortfeasor after
being compensated by the insurer."6
Despite these and other claimed benefits,"7 insurance subrogation has
its critics. It has been described as a "monolithic and clumsy" approach to
210 KEErON & WIDISS, supra note 25, at 220. Legal subrogation is not available for
every type of insurance. Itis commonly afforded under property or casualty loss insurance
where there is a fixed financial loss, but it is less frequently provided under personal
insurance such as life and health insurance. See generally 3 APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN,
supra note 20, § 1675. A right of subrogation also may be provided by federal or state
statute. KEETON & Wrimss, supra note 25, at 220. Federal statutes providing for
subrogation can preempt state anti-subrogation statutes. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498
U.S. 52, 65 (1990) (holding that Employee Retirement Income Security Act preempts
application of Pennsylvania anti-subrogation law to self-funded employee benefit plans).
If the Study Committee's recommendations concerning tort claims are included in the
U.C.C. and enacted by the states, then it is possible that someday a clash might occur
between a federal subrogee and a secmed party claiming rights in the same tort claim.
' KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 25, at 220.
1 See HORN, supra note 24, at 54. The right of subrogation may be charcterized as
legal even when the insurance contract provides for conventional subrogation or when
subrogation is authorized by statute. See FREEDMAN, supra note 16, § 12:6[a]; 16 GEORGE
J. COUCH, COUCH ON INsuRANcE 2D § 61:20 (rev. ed. 1983).
3 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 25, at 252.
1"4 Id. at 220.
SKENNETH S. ABRAAM, DISmTiBuNG RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL ThEORY, AND
PUBUC PoucY 154 (1986).
16 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 25, at 220.
117 See ABRAHAM4 supra note 115, at 154 (stating that subrogation may help reduce
the long-rn cost of insurance); HORN, supra note 24, at 24-26, 106-07 (stating that
subrogation facilitates loss shifting between insu-ers and entities outside the insurance
industry); Roger M. Baron, Subrogation on Medical Expense Claim: The 'Double
Recovery" Myth and the Feasibility ofAnti-Subrogation Laws, 96 DICK. L. REV. 581, 581
(1992) (stating that subrogation may facilitate prompt indemnification of the insured).
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coordinating the allocation of risk"' It also has been portrayed as
creating a windfall for insurers because subrogation recoveries are not
considered in setting insurance rate structures." In some jurisdictions,
subrogation is prohibited for certain types of insurance by statute or case
law." Subrogation to nonassignable tort claims may or may not be
allowed.'
b. Devices in Aid of Subrogation
Insurance policies often contain express language providing for
conventional subrogation.' Insurers may also employ a "loan re-
ceipt."' This device typically provides that the insurer loans funds to
the insured to be repaid i1 and only to the extent that, the insured obtains
a recovery from the tortfeasor. Loan receipts sometimes "pledge" the
118 ABRAAM, s pra note 115, at 154. Professor Abraham also points out that in some
cases subrogation may impair fAll indemnity of the insured. Id. at 155. He argues that
subrogation should not be permitted unless it results in significant cost reduction or loss
prevention. Id. at 170.
1 Baron, supra note 117, at 582. Contra HORN, supra note 24, at 25, 190.
m ENTERPRiSE REsPONsIBfLY, supra note 84, at 164 & n.5; see also MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 540 (pertaining to no-fault motor vehicle liability insurance); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Druke, 576 P.2d 489, 492 (Ariz. 1978) (holding that subrogation provision in
medical insurance policy violates prohibition against assignment of tort claims). Federal
statutes providing for subrogation can preempt state anti-subrogation laws. See supra note
105.
' See 16 CoUCH, supra note 112, § 61:101 & n.16.
S ee 2 FREEMAN, supra note 16, § 12:6[u] (stating that a right to conventional
subrogation may also be expressed in a "subrogation receipt"). Also, compare the
Business Auto Coverage Form (1985):
TRANSFER OF RIGHTS OF RECOVERY AGAINST OTHERS TO US
If any person or organization to or for whom we make payment under this
Coverage Form has rights to recover damages from another, those rights are
transferred to us. That person or organization must do everything necessary to
secure our rights and must do nothing after "accident" or 'loss" to impair them.
KEE ON &WIDISS, supra note 25, at 1113, with the Homeowners 4 Contents Broad Form
(Ed. Apr. 1984):
Subrogation. An Insured may waive in writing before a loss all rights of
recovery against any person. If not waived, we may require an assignment of
rights of recovery for a loss to the extent that payment is made by us. If an
assignment is sougl, an Insured must sign and deliver all related papers and
cooperate with us. Subrogation does not apply under Section II to Medical
Payments to Others or Damage to Property of Others.
Id. at 1147.
in JERRY, supra note 108, at 478-82.
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insured's claim against or recovery from the tortfeasor as security for
repayment of the loan."u
Frequently, the loan receipt is based upon a legal fiction since the
"loan" is actually a payment of policy proceeds.'s The fiction is
employed because in many jurisdictions an insurer qua subrogee owns the
cause of action and is the real party in interest for purposes of instituting
a lawsuit. Therefore, the insurer qua subrogee must sue in its own name.
Insurers preferring not to appear before a jury may be permitted to avoid
real-party-in-interest status by means of a fictitious loan to the insured,
in which case the insured remains the owner of the claim and the real
' See Francis I. Kenney Jr., The Loan Receipt and Its Use by Insurers: Consider-
ations and Suggestions, 10 FoRUM 920, 921-23 (1975). For example, in City Stores Co.
v. Lemer Shops, Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the divided court held that
the insurer was a real party in interest under the following loan receipt
RECEIVED FROM Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company Twenty seven
thousand eight hundred ninety and 18/100 - Dollars, as a loan and repayable
only to the extent of any net recovery we may make from any person or
persons, corporation or corporations, on account of loss by fire to our property
on or about September 7, 1963 or from any insurance effected by such person
or persons, corporation or corporations.
As security for such repayment, we hereby pledge to said Lumberman's
Mutual Casualty Company the said recovery and deliver to it all documents
necessary to show our interest in said property, and we agree to enter and
prosecute suit against such person or persons, corporation or corporations on
account of said claim for said loss, with all due diligence, at the expense and
under the exclusive direction and control of said Lumbenman's Mutual Casualty
Company.
Id. at 1011 n. (emphasis added). Not all trust receipts contain language expressly
pledging the insured's claim or recovery, as illustrated by this example:
Received from... the sum of... Dollars not as payment of any claim but
as a loan and repayable (without interest) only to the extent of any net recovery
the undersigned may make from any person or persons, corporation or
corporations, or others, on account of loss by ... to ... on or about ....
As security for such repayment the undersigned hereby agrees with said
insurer to enter and prosecute suit against such person or persons, corporation
or corporations, or others, on account of said claim for said loss, with all due
diligence, at the expense and under the exclusive direction and control of said
insurer.
It is admitted and agreed by the undersigned that the amount due the
undersigned, by reason of the loss referred to in this agreement, is irrevocably
fixed at the amount of the loan designated in this agreement
It is- further agreed that, in the event the undersigned shall recover any
amount in excess of... Dollars, he shall be entitled to retain such excess, and
shall not be required to pay over to said insurer any portion of said excess.
2 FREEDMAN, supra note 16, § 12:6[t], at 396 (emphasis added).
m JEMRY, supra note 108, at 479.
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party in interest. 6 However, occasionally the loan is, in reality, a loan.
For example, an insurer with uncertain liability to its insured may be
willing to loan funds to the insured secured by any future recovery from
the tortfeasor.'
"Trust agreements" or "trust receipts" are also employed by insurers
in aid of subrogation.' These devices create an express trust requiring
the trustee/insured to repay the beneficiary/insurer from any recovery
obtained from a tortfeasor.' Like the loan receipt, the purpose of these
devices is to keep the insurer from being a real party in interest.130
c. Insurers' Subrogation Rights and Article Nine
How would insurers claiming subrogation be affected if the Study
Committee's proposal to include tort claims within Article Nine's scope
'2 See generally V. Woemer, Annotation, Inmrance: Validity and Effect of Loan
Receipt or Agreement Between Insured and Insurer for a Loan Repayable to Extent of
Insured's Recovey From Another, 13 A.L.R. 3D 42 (1967).
' JERRY, supra note 108, at 479-80. An insurer that makes such a loan must make clear
that the tort claim and its proceeds are collateral See Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bargain City,
U.SA, Inc., 373 F.2d 701, 703 (3d Cir.) (holding that insurer did not acquire an equitable lien
on the proceeds of a tort claim), cert denied, 389 U.S. 825 (1967).
' 2 FREEDMAN, supra note 16, § 12:6[v]; HORN, supra note 24, at 77-78.
For example:
Trust Agreement: In the event of payment to any person under this Part:
(a) the company shall be entitled to the extent of such payment to the
proceeds of any settlement orjudgment that may result from the exercise of any
rights of recovery of such person against any person or organization legally
responsible for the bodily injury because of which such payment is made;
(b) such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the company all rights
of recovery which he shall have against such other person or organization
because of the damages which are the subject of claim made under this Part;
(c) such person shall do whatever is proper to secure and shall do nothing
alter loss to prejudice such rights;
(d) if requested in writing by the company, such person shall take, through
any representative designated by the company, such action as may be necessary
or appropriate to recover such payment as damages from such other person or
organization, such action to be taken in the name of such person; in the event
of a recovery, the company shall be reimbursed out of such recovery for
expenses, costs and attorneys' fees incurred by it in connection therewith,
(e) such person shall execute and deliver to the company such instruments
and papers as may be appropriate to secure the rights and obligations of such
person and the company established by this provision.
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 25, at 1119 (quoting Family Combination Automobile
Form (Rev. Jan. 1, 1963)) (emphasis added).
. 2 FREEDMAN, supra note 16, § 12:6[v], at 400.
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is ultimately enacted into state law? This question may be broken into
two constituent issues. First, would insurers' subrogation rights be treated
as Article Nine security interests? If not, then how would their extra-Code
rights fare in competition with Article Nine security interests encumbering
tort claims?
The answer to the initial issue is that the legal and conventional
subrogation rights of insurers generally would not be treated as Article
Nine security interests. A persuasive argument supporting this conclusion
can be built upon the statutory bedrock of the U.C.C. The building blocks
are as follows.
First, extra-Code principles of law and equity supplement the Code
unless displaced by its particular provisions."' Subrogation doctrine has
frequently been employed as a supplement to Article Nine and has not
been displaced by the Code." Second, Article Nine applies to security
interests created by consensual agreement. Legal subrogation rights
are not consensual, as they arise instead by operation of law independent
of contract terms." Therefore, such rights are not within the Article's
scope. Third, Article Nine applies to interests that are intended to secure
a debtor's obligation." In most cases, insurers' legal and conventional
subrogation rights are not intended to create a security arrangement and
do not secure an obligation of the insured.136 Rather, the assignment of
the insured's tort claim is absolute in nature and comes about because the
insurer has honored its obligation under the insurance contract to pay
policy proceeds. 7 The assignment results in the "complete surrender"
of the insured's tort claim to the insurerM That subrogation rights do
' U.C.C. § 1-103. See generally BIMAN ET AL., supra note 44, 1.04[2], at 1-7
(stating that U.C.C. § 1-103 "preserves the evolving body of common law and equitable
doctrine").
3 See HnniAN Er AL., supra note 44, 24.01 (discussing priority through
subrogation).
See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(1), (2), 9-105(1)a). The Study Committee'smany
proposals would not alter this fundamental character of Article Nine.
' See supra text accompanying note 105.
"' See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(1), 9-105(1)().
Subrogation rights do not secure the insured's obligation to pay premiums. Failure
to pay premiums generally terminates the insurer's obligation to pay policy proceeds.
JERRY, supra note 108, at 387-88.
7 To obtain subrogation, the insurer must make payment to the insured. Id. at 465-
67.
" See City Stores Co. v. Lemer Shops, Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(holding that an insurer becomes the real party in interest in a lawsuit against a third party
when the insurer's liability is absolute and the insumer settles a claim by the loan receipt
method).
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not secure insurers is also indicated by the rule in many jurisdictions that
the insured is reimbursed first out of any recovery from the tort claim for
losses not covered by insurance before the insurer obtains any reimburse-
ment.
139
Loan and trust receipts sometimes muddy the waters by disguising an
absolute transfer of a tort claim as a security arrangement. Thus, it may
seem that an insurer employing one of these devices is subject to a risk
that it will be hoist by its own petard and have its rights judicially
assimilated to an Article Nine secured party's."4 This result would be
clearly incorrect. Under Article Nine, substance controls form. "' The
reality is that these devices in aid of subrogation merely provide a means,
sanctioned in some but not all jurisdictions, for an insurer to use an
insured's name as a party plaintiff in litigation controlled by the insur-
er.
42
Despite the conclusion that subrogation rights are generally not
security interests, an insurer may be properly concerned about having to
comply with a revised Article Nine if it in fact makes a loan to the
insured because the insurer's liability under the policy is uncertain or for
some other reason. If the loan is contractually secured by the insured's
tort claim, 143 then the insurer would be subject to the Article Nine
revision encompassing tort claims as collateral. The transaction would
have to comply with the Article to create an enforceable and perfected
security interest because the insurer and the insured have entered into an
" This result sometimes may be altered by agreement See KEETON & WIDISS, mqira
note 25, § 3.10(b)(1) (explaining alternative approaches of allocating recoveries when an
insurer has a subrogation interest).
140 Loan receipts may contain a "pledge" of the insured's tort claim. See supra text
accompanying notes 122-25. An insurer's trust receipt might be improperly likened to the
security device of the same name. See U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (providing that Article Nine
applies to "trust receipts" that are security devices). See generally 1 GiLMoRE, supra note
2, § 4.2 (discussing trust receipts).
141 See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (providing that Article Nine applies to transactions
intended to create security interests). See generally CLARY, supra note 37, 1.03[1], at
1-14 (stating that the "key" to coverage by Article Nine is an intent to create a security
interest).
142 See City Stores Co., 410 F.2d at 1015 (stating that an insurer cannot avoid
becoming a real party in interest through a "sham loan agreemenf. These devices are
used for other nonsecurity reasons as well. For example, they are employed to establish
conventional subrogation when the insurance contract is silent on the matter. See
generally HORN, supra note 24, at 84-87.
... This situation occasionally occurs. See supra text accompanying note 126.
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agreement creating a security interest in a tort claim." This require-
ment is appropriate.
Having concluded that insurers' subrogation rights generally would
not be treated as Article Nine security interests, it is possible to consider
the second issue constituent in the question of how insurers would be
affected if an Article Nine amended to encompass security interests in tort
claims were enacted into state law. The question is, what priority rules
apply to these insurers? In particular, how would their extra-Code rights
fare in competition with an Article Nine security interest encumbering tort
claims?14 Here, case law is informative.'"
d The "National Shawmut Bank Line".
Article Nine's historic failure to encompass tort claims as collateral
naturally resulted in a lack of case law dealing with the interaction of
insurers' subrogation rights and security interests in tort claims. The
brightest judicial illumination available for these potential conflicts is
provided by a long line of cases dealing with Article Nine and the
subrogation rights of construction sureties. The leading opinion is
National Shawimut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.47
In National Shawmut Bank, a general contractor entered into
construction contracts with the United States and applied to a surety for
'" Perhaps insurers would welcome the relative legal certainty afforded by
compliance with Article Nine. Cf. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc.,
373 F.2d 701, 703 (3d Cir.) (holding that insurer did not acquire an equitable lien on the
proceeds of a tort claim), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 825 (1967).
"s The priority issue of insurers versus secured party does not actually arise unless
the insured/debtor is in default under the security agreement. See U.C.C. § 9-501(1).
'' Article Nine contains a rule stating that security interests are effective according
to their terms against purchasers of the collateral and creditors. U.C.C. § 9-201. It also
contains rules governing competition between some extra-Code rights and security
interests, see, e.g., id. § 9-310 (governing priority between security interests and
possessory liens), and provides that the debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or
involuntarily transferred. See id. § 9-311. However, the Article contains no provision
explicitly addressing the priority of subrogation claims. No such provision is recommend-
ed by the Study Committee. The case law discussed in the text is not the only conceivable
approach for resolving priority between a secured party and an insurance subrogee.
Commercial law and assignment principles also might be applied. See Steven L. Harris,
Using Fundamental Principles of Commercial Law to Decide UCC Cases, 26 LOY. LA..
L. REV. 637 (1993); supra note 71.
'4 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969). The court applied the Code as enacted in
Massachusetts. Id. at 847. Differences between this statute and the current official text of
the Code are noted as necessary for clarity and accuracy.
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payment and performance bonds.' The application for the bonds
contained an assignment to the surety "of earned monies that may be due
or become due under said contract.'14  This assignment was not
perfected under Article Nine. Subsequent to posting the bonds, the
contractor obtained credit from a bank. For collateral, the bank obtained
a perfected Article Nine security interest in the contractor's present and
subsequently acquired funds from the United States."s°
After the contractor defaulted, the surety completed the work pursuant
to its bond obligations. Both the surety and the bank sought to satisfy
their respective claims from earned progress payments. The First Circuit
viewed the critical issue as whether the doctrine of subrogation survived
the enactment of Article Nine.'
Much of the court's reasoning is similar to this Article's analysis of
whether insurers' subrogation rights would be security interests under an
Article Nine revised to encompass tort claims." The court concluded,
' "These bonds were required by the Miller Act governing federal construction
projects. See 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) (1988).
t National Shawmut Bank; 411 F.2d at 844.
"Id. Notice of the assignment was given by the bank to the United States as
required by the Assignment of Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1964) (current version at 31
U.S.C. § 3727 (1988)). However, no written notice was given to the surety as also
required by the act. The First Circuit found it unnecessary to decide the effect of this
failure. National Shawinut Bank, 411 FId at 844.
' National Sh7awmit Bank, 411 F.2d at 844.
' See supra text accompanying notes 131-39. The court reasoned as follows. First,
subrogation is based upon extra-Code legal principles that supplement Article Nine's
provisions and are not displaced by the Article. National Szawnut Bank; 411 F.2d at 845.
Second, subrogation rights do not constitute an interest in personal property securing
payment or performance of an obligation. Id. Rather than an interest in personalty, the
surety's security is its opportunity upon the contractor's default to finish the job and apply
any available fids against its cost of completion. The surety's right to minimize its loss
by finishing the job is not the kind of independently valuable personalty which falls
within a statute applying to transactions intended to create a security interest. Nor are the
surety's rights the same as the interest of a buyer of accounts or contract rights which are
also encompassed in the definition of security interest under Massachusetts law. (An
"account" is a nonnegotiable right to payment for goods sold or leased, or services
rendered, and a "contract right" is any nonnegotiable contractual right to payment not yet
earned by performance.) Id. at 846. No account exists because when the contractor
defaults, no right to payment exists. A contract right is a right to receive payments from
one who continues with the performance rather than a right conditioned on performance
by the transferee of the right the surety. See id. (Contract rights are no longer a separate
class of Article Nine collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-106. See generally UNIFoRM LAWS
ANNOTATED, suqra note 21, at 20-21.) Third, Article Nine applies to security interests
created by contacL National Shawmui Banl; 411 F.2d at 846. The surety's rights arise
by virtue of its status independent of any express contractual terms. These rights may
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"[E]quitable subrogation is too hardy a plant to be uprooted by a Code
which speaks around but not to the issue. 153
National Shawmut Bank and its many progeny generally are read as
holding that conflicts between construction sureties and secured parties
fall entirely outside of Article Nine and that subrogating sureties prevail
in that environment.i Sureties prevail in cases involving private
construction contracts as well as those, like National Shawmut Bank,
containing federal or state statutory bonding requirements. 155 Sureties
prevail even when the secured party's perfected security interest is prior
in time to the suretyship contract or to the surety's payment which
triggers its subrogation rights." Multiple rationales for favoring
grow out of a contractual setting and be articulated by a contract However, they ame
created by law to avoid injustice. Id. at 847.
1- National Shzawmut Bank; 411 F.2d at 849.
'"See CLAEK, supra note 37, 1.07; HIMANEr AL., supra note 44, 24.01[2] [a] [fi];
WHITE & SummES, stpra note 96, at § 21-6. However, some reasoning in National
Shawmut Bank may suggest that the subrogation rights of a construction surety
supplement Article Nine and must be accommodated within the Article's sphere. Drafting
history may also support this conclusion. See Edward A. Dauer, Government Contractors,
Commercial Banlr, and Miller Act Bond Sureties - A Question of Priorities, 14 B.C.
INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 943, 970 & n.143 (1973). The National Shawmut Bank line has
not been without critics. See id. at 943, 966-71. See generally Benjamin Geva, Bonded
Construction Contracts: What Are a Surety's Rights to Withhold Funds?, 3 CORP. L. REV.
50 (1980); John C. Tecklenburg II, Comment, Equitable Subrogation - Too Hardy a
Plant to be Uprooted by Article 9 of the UCC?, 32 U. Prrr. L. REv. 580 (1970-1971).
155 See, e.g., Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-Nat'l Batteries, Inc., 427 F.2d 856, 858-
59 (lst Cir. 1970) (stating that the propositions enunciated inNaional Shawmut Bank are
not confined to cases where the United States is the owner).
" The following are some of the analytic threads running through the National
Shawmut Bank line. First, the funds in dispute never become the debtor's property because
of the surety relationship, and therefore the security interest cannot attach to them. See,
e.g., Centex-Simpson Constr. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 795 F. Supp. 35, 41 (D. Me.
1992). Second, timing is irelevant to an analysis of the surety's rights unde the doctrine
of equitable subrogation. See, e.g., In re Ward Land Clearing & Drainage, Inc., 73 B.I
313, 315 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987). Third, a construction surety's rights relate back to the
time of the suretyship contract. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. First State
Bank, 494 P.2d 1149, 1157 (Kan. 1972). Fourth, the surety's priority is justified on the
grounds that secured financers such as banks either am or should be aware that payments
due the debtor on account of a construction contract may be subject to subrogation rights.
See, e.g., Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 531 P.2d 1370,
1376 (OkIa. 1975). Fifth, the surety prevails under subrogation principles unless its claim
is grounded "solely" upon an express assignment, in which case its priority is governed
by Article Nine. See, e.g., Alaska State Bank v. General Ins. Co., 579 P.2d 1362, 1371-72
(Alaska 1978). Sixth, a surety's assignment is contingent upon the surety's payment inthe
event the debtor defaults, which distinguishes its rights from those of an Article Nine
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sureties are advanced in the case law, many of which could be extended
to a subrogating insurer seeking reimbursement from a tort cause of
action or derivative rights also claimed by a secured party under a revised
Article Nine. For example, timing arguably is irrelevant to an analysis of
the surety's subrogation rights, and the surety's priority is justified
because secured financers should be aware that tort claims may be subject
to subrogation.1
7
Of course, only the rights of construction sureties were before the
First Circuit in National Shawmut Bank. It is arguable that the opinion
provides little or no authority for the proposition that subrogating insurers
should prevail in competition with Article Nine security interests in tort
claims. National Shawmut Bank's precedential value on this issue also is
arguably weak because of statements by the First Circuit concerning the
nature of construction sureties and their subrogation rights.' 8 The court
reasoned that the surety enjoys a "unique" cluster of subrogation rights
when it pays the outstanding bills of the construction job and completes
secured creditor. See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank, N.A., 540 So. 2d 113,
116 (Fla. 1989). Seventh, priority for the surety is justified because the interests of all
concerned with a construction project are best served by the surety's prompt performance.
See, e.g., id. Eighth, the purposes of Article Nine's filing requirements are not served by
holding that subrogation rights are security interests. J.V. Gleason Co. v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 452 F.2d 1219, 1222-23 (8th Cir. 1971) (involving priority contest between
construction surety and bankruptcy trustee).
17 See supra note 156.
I The National Shawmut Bank court also supported its holding with arguments that
are not specifically applicable to subrogating insurers or other reimbursement claimants.
An important prong in the court's reasoning was the historic fact of the Code drafters'
rejection of a proposed U.C.C. § 9-312(7) which would have subordinated construction
sureties to the rights of secured lenders. The court viewed this as demonstrating that the
construction sureties "had won the battle to defend the preserve of subrogation." National
Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d 843, 846 (lst Cir. 1969). See
generally Dauer, supra note 154, at 968-69 (discussing the rise and fall of proposed
U.C.C. § 9-312(7)). Post-National Shawiut Bank cases dealing with disputes between
secured parties and sureties have employed this reasoning. See, e.g., United States Fidelity
& Gumr. Co. v. United Penn Bank, 524 A.2d 958, 964 (Pa. Super. CL 1987). Also
important to the National Shawmut Bank court was a substantial body of precedent which
it viewed as upholding the right of a competing surety to earned but unpaid progress
payments. National Shawmut Bank, 411 F.2d at 847-48. Some of the additional reasoning
in National Shawinut Bank is more relevant to insurance subrogation. For example, the
court relied upon a prior holding that "[n]o provision of the U.C.C. purports to affect the
fundamental equitable doctrine of subrogation." Id. at 847 (quoting French Lumber Co.,
Inc. v. Commercial Realty & Fin. Co., 195 N.E.2d 507, 510 (Mass. 1964)). This
precedent involved a priority contest between two creditors, neither of which was a
construction surety. See HmuAN Er AL., supra note 44, 24.01l1] (discussing priority
through subrogation).
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the job.59 These rights, it stated, are instrumental in the surety's
business, which also is unique. According to the opinion, it is not a
business of "ordinary" insurance because the surety's risk is not actuar-
ially linked to premiums and the risks are not pooled.".
These statements to the contrary notwithstanding, National Shawmut
Bank supports the conclusion that insurers' reimbursement rights would
prevail over security interests in tort claims. In portraying the construction
surety as unique, the First Circuit was emphasizing the strength of the
surety's equities relative to the bank's.'' The subrogation rights of
insurers possess their own strong equities, enjoy a long history, and are
widely recognized in many jurisdictions as being supported by sound
policy."6 Construction suretyship principles like those considered in
National Shawmut Bank are integral to insurance theory and practice,
particularly where subrogation is concerned.
National Shawrnut Bank 411 F.2d at 845 (stating that the surety "stands in the
shoes of the contractor insofar as there are receivables due it; in the shoes of laborers and
material men who have been paid by the surety - who may have had liens; and, not least,
in the shoes of the government for whom the job was completed").
'60 Id. The First Circuit also pointed out that the construction surety's business is not
one of "ordinary" financing either. The court reasoned that an ordinary financer such as
a bank faces specific requests for funds which it links to suitable collateral. Subsequent
requests are determined by an assessment of the debtor's then current management and
available additional security. In case of default, the bank takes its security. On the other
hand, a construction surety extends credit to the project owner as the ultimate guarantee
of the job, hoping this credit will never be drawn upon. The surety's collateral is its
confidence in the contractor and the opportunity to prevent or minimize its ultimate loss
by its own performance. If the surety's confidence in the contractor is misplaced, then it
receives very little from the contractor but the right to complete the job. In case of
default, the surety must go ahead and perform. Id.
1 See id. at 845 (citing Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 140 (1962), a
case awarding priority in retained funds to a surety over a bankruptcy trustee in which the
Supreme Court noted that the equities of construction sureties are "deeply imbedded" in
our commercial practices). The National Shawmut Bank line of cases indicates that
construction sureties trump other claimants because construction bonds protect material
providers and other persons responsible for the physical completion of construction
projects and that the surety's role is essential to the economy. See, e.g., United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. First State Bank, 494 P.2d 1149, 1154 (Kan. 1972) (stating that
the completion of construction contracts is vital to the economy); Canter v. Schlager, 267
N.E.2d 492, 496 (Mass. 1971) (suggesting that subcontractors rely on payment bonds).
162 See HORN, supra note 24, at 15-17.
16 HORN, supra note 24, at 223. In his discussion of corporate suretyship, the author
of this treatise stated that "the doctrine of subrogation is common to both bonds and
contracts of insurance and constitutes a conceptual meeting ground for the two
mechanisms." Id. at 242-43. Because of their similar purposes, textual discussions of
subrogation by sureties and isu may be intertwined. See 16 COUCH, supra note 112,
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C. Towards a Balance
The reasons for including tort causes of action and derivative rights
within Article Nine's scope are persuasive. Article Nine and the National
Shawmut Bank line of cases provide insurers and others with a robust
argument that their reimbursement rights should not be affected by the
inclusion of tort claims within the Article's scope except in a minority of
cases where these rights are actually security interests that should be
subject to a revised Article Nine.' " However, concerns stemming from
the spectre of the witch's brew and the fear of dragnets seemingly have
merit. Failure by Article Nine's revisers to carefully consider these
concerns and draft accordingly could result in a revised official text that
does not contain the "best" solutions to commercial law issues, that is
less likely to be enacted, or that may be enacted with nonuniform
language concerning tort claims. 65 Yet, it seems undesirable to load a
§§ 61:18, 61:306 - :322. Construction suretyship has been described as a type of
insurance. E.g., J.V. Gleason Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 452 F.2d 1219, 1223-24
(8th Cir. 1971) (involving priority contest between construction surety and bankruptcy
trustee).
' Read together, Article Nine's text and the National Shawmut Bank line strongly
suggest that most insurers' subrogation rights would not constitute security interests and
that these extra-Code rights would trump security interests in tort claims if Article Nine
were revised to permit them. See spra text accompanying notes 131-63. Although, in the
author's opinion, it is not necessary to do so, it would be possible to amend Article Nine
to address these issues. For example, consideration might be given to amending U.C.C.
§ 9-104 to provide that the Article does not apply to transfers by subrogation. This
amendment would make clear that a subrogating insurer (or other reimbursement claimant
employing a subrogation theory) does not have to comply with Article Nine. It would not
expressly address the question of a subrogating insurer's priority against security interests,
but perhaps it would do so by implication if it is read as broadly codifying the National
Shawmut Bank line. Sometimes insurers enter into transactions that would create Article
Nine secured transactions in tort claims if the Article were amended to permit them. As
previously indicated, the author believes that in these cases insurers should comply with
Article Nine, including filing a financing statement to perfect their security interests. See
supra text accompanying notes 143-44. However, the Article could be amended to provide
for automatic perfection without filing for security interests created in tort claims by
insurers. CY.U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (providing various automatic perfection rules). Of course,
an automatically perfected security interest can be defeated in a priority dispute with
another secured party. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (stating that competing security interests
rank in order of filing or perfection). Therefore, maximal protection for insurers would
require a special priority role. . id. § 9-312(2) (providing a special priority for current
crop production loans). Some reimbursement claimants may not rely on subrogation
theory. Their rights might also be reflected in amendments to the official text of Article
Nine. See supra note 100.6 See generally Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the
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revised Article with extensive provisions governing security interests in
tort claims in order to address concerns which may vary in merit and
intensity from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Where lies the balance?
The next part of this Article considers possible amendments to Article
Nine specifically addressing the spectre of the witch's brew and the fear
of dragnets. This discussion should help make it possible to gauge the
extent and complexity of amendments necessary to address these concerns
and to reach a final conclusion concerning what amendments are desirable
in bringing tort claims into the Article's scope.
Il. REmSING ARTICLE NNE
Tort claims should be included within the scope of a revised Article
Nine. Nonetheless, while the Article's current broad exclusion should be
repealed, a case for a limited exclusion of personal tort claims may still
exist.
166
Personal claims are never proceeds of original collateral within
Article Nine's scope." Therefore, the argument that personal tort
claims should be included under a revised Article because they are a
substitute for tortiously damaged collateral can simply not be made."
An exclusion of personal tort claims would answer many of the objec-
tions that might be raised against including tort claims in a revised Article
Nine. For example, if personal tort claims were excluded, then objections
to the revision by reimbursees such as insurers would fall away to the
extent they seek reimbursement from personal claims. Also reduced,
possibly substantially, would be objections based upon the spectre of the
witch's brew and dragnet concerns. 9 Thus, the question of whether to
exclude personal tort claims is a threshold issue.
Uniform Law Process. Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 83 (1993) (arguing that the process of making uniform law should be highly
representative).
'6 This possibility was recognized by the Study Committee. See PEB Study Group,
supra note 4.
1" Presumably a creditor cannot take or enforce a security interest in a human being.
See U.C.C. § 9-102 (stating that Article Nine applies to security interests in "personal
property"); see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. XII (abolishing slavery). But see SPANOGLE Er
AL., CONSUMER LAw: CASES AND MATElIALs 586-87 (2d ed. 1991) (considering
incarceration as a debt collection tool).
See supra text accompanying notes 44-50.
'"Objections against including non-personal tort claims within the Article's scope
could still be made.
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A. Whether to Exclude Personal Tort Claims Only
It would be easy to amend the existing broad exclusion of all tort claims
contained in section 9-104(k) of the Code so that it becomes a limited
exclusion of personal tort claims only.170 Using the convention that addi-
tional words are underlined, the amended exclusion would read as follows:
"This Article does not apply... to a transfer in whole or in part of any claim
arising out of personal tort... !" The term "personal tort" has a sufficiently
certain yet flexible meaning so that it is appropriate to employ it in a uniform
law without definition. 7' Whether a particular tort claim is personal in
nature would be governed by the extra-Code law of each enacting jurisdic-
tion. The phrase "arising out of" and the term "claim" continue the ambiguity
currently residing in the official text exclusion of all tort claims."r
Retaining this ambiguity seems desirable because it would provide the
opportunity for a court to uphold a security interest in a derivative right
arising out of a personal tort cause of action, such as a right to payment
pursuant to a settlement agreement between a tort victim and a tortfeasor,
even though the cause of action itself would not fall within the Article's
scope.73
The case for this limited exclusion is far from open and shut. Including
personal tort claims as collateral within the scope of Article Nine would not
be the equivalent of a pronouncement from The American Law Institute and
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws that tort
causes of action and derivative rights should be employed as collateral under
all circumstances and for all purposes, all nonuniform state law and policy to
the contrary notwithstanding. 74 A jurisdiction that repeals Article Nine's
1' See supra note 2. Other ways to address concerns regarding personal tort claims
exist. One way would be to add statutory language or official commentary to the revised
Article Nine in order to make clear that repeal of the general tort claims exclusion is not
intended to affect state laws restricting the alienability of tort claims. Cf, e.g., U.C.C. §
2-306(2) (providing reference to possibility that an exclusive dealing contract might be
unlawful under antitrust laws); Ua § 9-201 & cmt. (providing references to statutes or
regulations governing credit transactions); id § 9-206(1) (containing references to
consumer protection statutes or case law). See also, e.g., id. § 9-102 (providing note to
adopting legislatures).
'7' See supra text accompanying notes 39-41, 71-72. The original Restatement of
Contracts provided that an assignment of a claim for damages "the gist of which is to the
person rather than to property" is illegal. RESTATEMENT Op THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
547(1)(d) (1932). Commentary indicated that damages for injuries including assault, libel,
slander, and breach of promise to marry are personal in nature. See id. cirt e.
'~ See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
17 See mipra text accompanying notes 25-28. To help insure this result, the exclusion
might be worded to recognize an exception for the proceeds of personal tort claims. Q.
U.C.C. §§ 9-104(g), (1); 9-306.
74 C. PEB Study Group, supra note 4, at 178-80 (recommending consideration be
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current broad tort claim exclusion would not by implication repeal extra-Code
law and policy restricting transactions in tort claims.175 Secured transactions
involving tort causes of action and derivative rights would continue to be
subject to restriction or invalidation to the extent they are inconsistent with
extra-Code legal principles.176
The wisdom of excluding personal tort claims from a revised Article
Nine also is questionable when one recalls that in some jurisdictions
derivative rights may fall within Article Nine's scope even if tort causes of
action do not. Even in jurisdictions where both tort causes of action and
derivative rights are excluded, creditors may be permitted to employ
assignment law to encumber these assets.17 It also is difficult to see why
secured creditors should not be permitted to take Article Nine security
interests in personal tort claims when unsecured creditors can participate in
the proceeds of a bankrupt debtor's personal tort claims. 79
Nor would an exclusion of personal tort claims only prevent financers
from taking security interests that directly contravene personal compensation
policy. A revised Article Nine, like the existing Article, would not preclude
secured parties and debtors/tort victims from encumbering means to cure or
rehabilitation such as wheel chairs, artificial limbs, or medicine.8 Even
Tiny Tim's crutches are fair game insofar as the Code is concerned.' The
policy of permitting debtors the contractual freedom to create security
given to amending Article Nine to permit a secured party to take a security interest in
otherwise nonassignable rights of the debtor in certain contracts or permits).175 Article Nine generally is not intended to validate practices which are illegal under
extra-Code statutory or regulatory law. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-203(4). Legal principles
relative to an "invalidating cause" supplement Article Nine unless displaced by its
particular provisions. See id. § 1-103. It has been held that extra-Code law may preclude
the use as collateral of some types of general intangibles within Article Nine's scope.
Liquor licenses are an example. They may not be employed as collateral in some
jurisdictions because of public policies favoring moderation in the consumption of
alcoholic beverages. See In re Eagles Nest, Inc., 57 B.R. 337 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986)
(holding liquor licenses unusable as collateral). See generally CLAPX, supra note 37,
1.03[2], at 1-18 to 1-21. The intent to not repeal extra-Code law could be expressed in
amendments to Article Nine. See supra note 170.
"' Principles of unconscionability originating outside Article Nine have been
employed to invalidate security interests. See HILLMAN Er AL., supra note 44, 19.02[2]
(Supp. 1992).
". See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
1 See smra text accompanying note 29.
'9 See supra notes 36, 37.
" See U.C.C. § 9-102 (stating that Article Nine applies to goods); id. § 9-109
(defining "consumer goods").
"' There are extra-Code state and federal restrictions on the use of security interests
in consumer goods. See CRANDALL, supra note 85, at 3-19 to 3-22. None are specifically
based upon personal compensation policy.
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interests in assets of their choice supports such security interests and cuts
against excluding personal tort claims from the revised Article."
B. Addressing Dragnet Concerns
One dragnet concern may be that security agreements encumbering
general intangibles could, contrary to the expectations of many debtors
and perhaps of many creditors as well, "drag in" tort causes of action and
derivative rights and "pick debtors clean."'" Another concern may be
that these security interests may benefit secured creditors but provide no
commensurate benefit to debtors such as more favorable credit terms. For
these reasons, it may be desirable for the revised Article Nine to
expressly restrict the breadth of security interests that could encumber tort
claims generally or personal tort claims in particular.
One way to accomplish such a restriction would be to modify Article
Nine's security agreement description-of-collateral requirement.' It
could be amended to require tort claims to be described with a degree of
specificity above and beyond a broad reference to general intangibles. For
example, the revised Article might require a security agreement reference
to "tort claims" if it is intended to cover them. To achieve even greater
specificity, the Article might require a reference sufficient to identify the
tortfeasor by name, the tort by description of the circumstances giving
rise to it, or even the docket number of a pending lawsuit.
A problem with this approach is that Article Nine provides very little
precedent for it. The Article employs a general description requirement
that the security agreement must make possible the identification of the
collateral." The single exception requiring greater specificity of
description has been the subject of convincing criticism.86 The Study
Committee has recommended its repeal."
", See id. § 1-102(2)(b) (stating that one underlying purpose of the U.C.C. is to
permait the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and
agreement of the parties).
1 See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
1" See U.C.C. §§ 9-110, 9-203 (providing Article Nine's description-of-collateral
requirements).
..5 See id. § 9-110 & cmat.
'" Id. § 9-203(1)(a) requires a description of the land concerned in the case of
security interests covering crops growing or to be grown or limber to be cut. The reason
stated for this special requirement is that a reference to the land is the "best" identifica-
tion of the collateral. Id. cmt. 2; see CLARY, smpra note 37, 8.05[l][b][ii] (stating that
such requirement serves no practical function and is filled with pitfalls).
'"PEB Study Group, supra note 4, at 182.
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A better approach for dealing with the dragnet problem is to
recognize that it comes about largely, though not entirely, through the
operation of security interests that attach to after-acquired general
intangibles." It is possible to limit the effectiveness of a security
agreement encumbering after-acquired assets, and Article Nine has done
so to protect consumers"' and farmers."9 Concerns that owners of
tort claims lack bargaining power, do not appreciate the consequences of
signing a security agreement encumbering after-acquired general
intangibles, or receive no compensation for the possibility that future tort
claims may be encumbered might similarly be addressed by a limitation
on the encumbrance of tort claims that arise in the future. By reducing
the number of security interests created in tort claims, this provision also
would address concerns relating to the spectre of the witch's brew and the
iU General intangibles are a type of collateral that, unlike cyclic assets such as
accounts receivable, generally do not turn over in the regular course of a debtor's
business. Thus, the intent to have a security interest attach to them as they arise in the
future probably needs to be expressed in the security agreement and is unlilely to be
implied. See CLAK, supra note 37, at 2-26 to 2-27. Tort claims owned by the debtor
when the security interest in general intangibles initially attaches would not be affected
by a limitation on the reach of an after-acquired property clause. However, a court might
nonetheless interpret the security agreement as not encumbering some or all presently
owned tort claims. See generally U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (providing that in order for a security
interest to attach, the debtor must agree to it); WTE & SUMMERS, supra note 96, §§ 22-
3, 22-4.
.. See U.C.C. § 9-204(2) which provides that a security interest cannot attach under
an after-acquired property clause to consumer goods when given as additional security
unless the debtor obtains rights in them within ten days after the secured party gives
value. This provision's general effect is to limit security interests in consumer goods to
those based on purchase money. CLARK, supra note 37, 12.04[4]. It is noteworthy that
the class of persons who own consumer goods as defined by Article Nine and the
potential victims of personal tort claims are substantially, if not entirely, the same natural
persons. Consumer goods are goods acquired primarily for personal, family, or household
use. See U.C.C. § 9-109(1). Thus, they are acquired by natural persons. See CLARY, supra
note 37, 12.01[2] (distinguishing between goods acquired for consumer use and goods
acquired for business use). The gist of a personal tort is injury to natural persons. See
supra notes 72, 171 and accompanying text.
'oPrior to its 1972 amendments, Article Nine provided that "no security interest
attaches to crops which become such more than one year after the security agreement is
executed ....." UNiFoRm LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note 21, at 447. This provision's
purpose was to protect necessitous farmers. Id. at 448. It was dropped from the official
text because the provision appeared meaningless in operation, caused unnecessary paper
work, and was uncertain. Id. However, it was retained by some jurisdictions. Id. at
450.
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reimbursement rights of insurers and others. A provision limiting after-
acquired property clauses encumbering tort claims might be drafted as
follows: "No security interest attaches under an after-acquired property
clause to personal tort claims unless the debtor has rights in them at the
time the security agreement is executed.''. This amendment would not
affect security interests in tort claims that are claimed as proceeds of
other collateral."
The case for this amendment is not open and shut either. The dragnet
problem is alleviated to some degree by case law recognizing that intent
to create a security interest in specific assets may be lacking even though
they are encompassed by the literal terms of the security agreement. 93
For this reason, a leading commentator recommends that a bare reference
to general intangibles be avoided, especially where it is possible to
identify a specific class of general intangibles (such as tort claims) in
advance." Unconscionability principles also might be judicially applied
to police the breadth of a security agreement which appears to be
overreaching because it encumbers a particular tort claim under general
descriptive language."5 An obvious shortcoming of both of these
alternatives is that most security interests are enforced without judicial
review. Neither of these approaches to the dragnet problem is as certain
as a statutory limitation in the Code on the reach of after-acquired
property clauses encumbering future tort claims. However, even without
this limit, extra-Code consumer protection legislation may preclude a
creditor from taking a security interest in a personal tort claim. 6
1 Presumably a debtor has rights in a tort cause of action when it arises as a matter
of tort law. See generally WHIr= & SUMMERS, supra note 96, § 22-6 (stating that one
must look outside of Article Nine to determine the extent of a debtor's rights). Other
drafting possibilities exist. For example, another approach would require the debtor to
have rights at the time the secured party gives value. See U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (defining
'value').
"' Since proceeds are substitute collateral, it seems appropriate to allow the security
interest to attach to future tort claims that are proceeds. See supra note 44. The Article
Nine Study Committee has recommended that the definition of proceeds be amended to
include tort claims. PEB Study Group, supra note 4, at 106.
m See generally CLARY, supra note 37, 2.02[3][a], 2.09[5][c], [d]; WH=E &
SUMMERS, sumra note 96, § 21-5.
' See CLARK, supra note 37, 2.09[5][c], at 2-112, 2-113. See generally supra note
170. Of course, creditors might begin to routinely include a reference to tort claims
in security agreement collateral descriptions if Article Nine is amended to encompass
them.
' See generally CLARK, supra note 37, 12.0412], at 12-22 & n.48.
' See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDrr CODE § 3.301 (1974) (providing that creditors
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IV. CONCLUDNG THOUGHTS
Article Nine's scope should be expanded to encompass security
interests in all types of tort causes of action and derivative rights. The
arguments for excluding personal tort claims only are not persuasive.
However, it must be acknowledged that the continued exclusion of
personal claims could help to alleviate fears relating to the witch's brew,
dragnet problems, and the rights of reimbursement claimants. Whether or
not personal claims are excluded from Article Nine, no other amendments
to the Article's official text or comments are necessary or desirable to
address these fears.
The inclusion in Article Nine of tort claims of any type may
necessitate an amendment to the Article's existing scope language which
excludes some judgments.97 The Article does not apply to a right
represented by a judgment unless the judgment was taken on a right to
payment which was itself collateral.98 Thus, the Article applies it for
example, the security interest is in an account receivable which subse-
quently is reduced to a judgment against the account debtor.'" Assum-
ing that tort claims were brought within Article Nine's scope, the Article
would apply where the security interest is in a tort claim which is
subsequently reduced to a judgment if the tort claim is a "right to
payment."2 '" A settlement agreement and some other derivative rights
provide rights to payment. However, a tort cause of action is a right to
sue for redress and probably is not a right to payment.20' If a tort cause
of action is not a right to payment, then it would be effectively excluded
from Article Nine whenever it is reduced to judgment without first being
converted to a derivative right that is both collateral and a right topaymentf °2
It is important to note the limited results of making tort claims
available as collateral under Article Nine. Tort claims would not become
negotiable. 3 Should its debtor default, the secured party enforcing a
generally may not take security interests in assets of the debtor other than what has been
sold). See generally CRANDAL , supra note 85, at 3-19 to 3-22.
"' See supra note 19.
See U.C.C. § 9-104(h).
" See CLARK, supra note 37, 1.0818].
See U.C.C. § 9-104(h) (emphasis added).
See MEuNKOFF'S DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 68.
" The entry of a judgment is declaratory of the fact and amount of the defendant's
liability. See JAcK H. FIMBENTHAL ET AL., CrvM PocEDuRE § 15.7, at 708 (1985).
2 Otherwise, a good faith purchaser from a tort victim could cut off the tortfeasor's
defenses. Professor Gilmore wrote that it is in the nature of intangible claims employed
482 [Vol 83
SECURITY INTERESTS IN TORT CLAIMS
security interest in a tort claim would, as a matter of commercial law, be
subject to the same defenses that might be asserted against the debtor/tort
victim by the tortfeasor and have the same burdens of proof as the
debtor. 4
In the event of default, a secured creditor would have multiple
remedial options. One would consist of "collection rights."205 For
example, suppose the debtor/tort victim and the tortfeasor previously
entered into a settlement agreement providing for periodic payments.
Collection rights would permit the secured party to notify the tortfeasor
to make the payments directly to the secured party.2ss
Article Nine provides two other remedies that might be invoked by
the secured party. One would be a right to dispose of the collateral and
apply the proceeds to the secured debt.207 The other, provided that it is
amended to apply to nonpledgeable intangibles, is a strict foreclosure
right to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt.208
Upon default the secured party would also have the rights and
remedies provided in the security agreement."° The agreement might
include provisions governing the post-default prosecution of a tort cause
of action, its settlement, and the disposition of its proceeds. Similar
language is sometimes included in security agreements encumbering
accounts receivable.210 Finally, the secured creditor would have the
in market transactions to move toward negotiability. 1 GIuMORF, supra note 2, at 381.
Tort claims are a very long way from this stage of development.20 This result follows from the fundamental "derivation" principle that a transferee
acquires only the rights of the transferor and no more. See Harris, supra note 146, at 638-
39; cf U.C.C. 9-318(1) (concerning rights of an assignee).
20 See U.C.C. § 9-502.
The tortfeasor, provided it is "obligated," would be an "account debtor" under
Article Nine terminology. See id. §§ 9-105(1)(a), 9-106, 9-502.
See id. § 9-504.
See id. § 9-505. As currently drafted, this remedy requires the secured party to be
'in possession" of the collateral, id., which seemingly would be impossible in the case
of a nonpledgeable intangible such as a tort cause of action or nonpledgeable derivative
rights such as contractual rights under a settlement agreement But see In re Martin-
Musumec, 1994 U.S. App. Lexis 4622; 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 698 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding under "unique facts" that a trust interest can be possessed for
purposes of strict foreclosure). By way of comparison, the promises or orders to pay
money represented by a negotiable promissory note or check are pledgeable intangibles.
This possession requirement for strict foreclosure may be modified or eliminated. See
PEB Study Group, supra note 4, at 239-41.
= U.C.C. § 9-501(1).
210 See 14 STONE, supra note 45, § 57.3, at 783 (setting forth a revolving loan
agreement). Insurance policies routinely deal with such matters in the event of
1994-95]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
right to enforce its security interest by "any available judicial proce-
dure."' These procedures would include supplementary proceedings
utilized by judgment creditors to reach rights of action 1
subrogation. See 10 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS § 149:335 (2d ed. 1972) (setting forth a
subrogation agrement).
11 U.C.C. § 9-501(1), (5).
212 See 9 EISENBERG, supra note 85, at 37A-117; see also id. 37-53 to 37-56
(discussing execution against tort claims).
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